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I.

INTRODUCTION

Defending architects, engineers, and contractors against legal
actions for purely economic losses on construction projects
brought by parties not in privity of contract has become common
in Minnesota. However, this was not always the case. In fact, this is
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still not the case in many other jurisdictions of the United States.
Minnesota’s current situation stems largely from its
consideration of the economic loss rule. This rule prohibits tort
recovery when a product—or here, a construction project involving
a combination of products and services—suffers damage, causing
economic loss, but not causing personal injury or damage to any
property other than itself. The rule has been cited as “the
fundamental boundary between contract law, which is designed to
enforce the expectancy interests of the parties, and tort law, which
imposes a duty of reasonable care and thereby encourages citizens
1
to avoid causing physical harm to others.”
In Minnesota, architects and engineers are liable in tort to
third parties, such as contractors, with whom they have no
2
contractual privity. This article will examine the development of
Minnesota’s treatment of the economic loss rule with respect to
construction projects and, specifically, design professionals such as
3
This article criticizes Minnesota’s
architects and engineers.
treatment of the economic loss rule and suggests that, at least in
Minnesota construction law, contract law has unnecessarily
4
drowned in a sea of tort.
II. HISTORY OF THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE
Three cases form the modern foundation of the economic loss
rule. The most commonly cited case to initiate the discussion is
5
Winterbottom v. Wright, in which the court refused to extend
6
contract obligations to third parties. Lord Abinger based his logic
on the “infinity of actions” and the “most absurd and outrageous
consequences” that might ensue if the parties who were not in
privity of contract were allowed to enforce contract obligations for
7
purely economic losses.

1. Sydney R. Barrett, Jr., Recovery of Economic Loss in Tort for Construction
Defects: A Critical Analysis, 40 S.C. L. REV. 891, 894–95 (1989).
2. Prichard Bros. v. Grady Co., 428 N.W.2d 391 (Minn. 1988).
3. This is not the first such critical examination. See Larry D. Espel, Liability
and Loss Allocation for Economic Losses in Construction Litigation Involving Design
Professionals, 13 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 81, 132 (1987).
4. See generally E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858,
866 (1986) (coining the phrase “contract law would drown in a sea of tort”).
5. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch. Div. 1842).
6. Id. at 404.
7. Id. at 405.
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8

In the second case, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., Justice
Cardozo implicitly held that there was a responsibility on the part
of the manufacturer of chattels—here, automobile tires—to the
ultimate consumer based not upon the contract itself but upon the
relation arising from the purchase and foreseeability of harm if
9
proper care was not used in manufacturing. This “foreseeability of
harm doctrine” has carried through to many of the cases in
Minnesota.
The final case emerged in 1931. In Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,
Justice Cardozo had the opportunity to once again discuss the
10
In his often-quoted statement, he
economic loss doctrine.
expressed his concern that abandonment of the rule would expose
parties to “liability in an indeterminate amount for an
11
The Ultramares
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.”
opinion arose out of an audit, which incorrectly certified that
capital and surplus were intact when, in reality, the underlying
12
corporation was insolvent. The plaintiff was a lender who had
relied upon the audit in response to request for loans to finance
13
the sale of rubber.
Justice Cardozo started his analysis by
recognizing that “[t]he defendants owed to their employer a duty
imposed by law to make their certificate without fraud, and a duty
growing out of contract to make it with the care and caution
14
proper to their calling.” He went on to analyze as follows:
A different question develops when we ask whether they
owed a duty to these to make it without negligence. If
liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or
blunder, the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath
the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to
a liability in an indeterminate amount for an
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. The
hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so
extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist
in the implication of a duty that exposes to these
15
consequences.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
Id. at 1051.
174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
Id. at 444.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 443.
Id. at 444.
Id.
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In recognizing the erosion of the privity barrier, Cardozo
stated, “The assault upon the citadel of privity is preceding in these
days apace. How far the inroads shall extend is now a favorite
16
subject of juridical discussion.” Recognizing his earlier decision in
MacPherson, he stated:
In the field of the law of torts a manufacturer who is
negligent in the manufacture of a chattel in circumstances
pointing to an unreasonable risk of serious bodily harm to
those using it thereafter may be liable for negligence
though privity is lacking between manufacturer and user.
A force or instrument of harm having been launched with
potentialities of danger manifest to the eye of prudence,
the one who launches it is under a duty to keep it within
bounds. Even so, the question is still open whether the
potentialities of danger that will charge with liability are
confined to harm to the person, or include injury to
property. In either view, however, what is released or set
in motion is a physical force. We are now asked to say that
a like liability attaches to the circulation of a thought or a
17
release of the explosive power resident in words.
Interestingly, in Ultramares, Justice Cardozo wrestled with the
erosion of the privity barrier and questioned whether his earlier
ruling in MacPherson should be limited to personal injury or
18
extended to property damage. As we know, the erosion of the
privity barrier did indeed extend to both personal injury and
19
property damage.
As will be seen, Minnesota abandoned the
economic loss rule as it applies to construction projects and design
professionals, but may now be well-poised to reexamine its position.
III. CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS
As the economic loss doctrine evolved under case law, the
structure of construction contracts advanced in the commercial
sector. In fact, in the area of commercial construction, contracts
utilized by the various parties to the construction project are
extremely well developed; they define the scope of work obligations
and limit the liability of the parties. In a typical construction
project, an Owner retains a Contractor and an Architect. Typically,
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 445.
Id. (citations omitted).
See id.
Id.
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the Architect then retains an Engineer. In turn, the Contractor
retains sub-contractors and material suppliers to supply material
and labor for completion of the project.
Numerous trade and professional organizations have drafted
model contracts for use in the construction industry. One of the
20
most common is the American Institute of Architects (AIA).
However, contracts developed by the Engineer’s Joint Contract
21
Documents Committee, the Associated General Contractors of
22
23
America, the Design-Build Institute of America, and others are
often used as well. For purposes of this discussion, the focus will be
on the contracts developed by the AIA.
On a typical commercial construction project, significant time
is spent negotiating the contracts between the various parties so as
to adequately define the scope of work, liability, and limitations on
liability of the various parties. The contract between the Owner
and the Contractor will consist of a construction contract AIA
24
25
A101 for lump sum contracts or AIA A111 for costs plus
contracts, along with definitions of cost and time of completion.
Also, the parties will typically incorporate AIA A201 General
26
Conditions, a multi-page document outlining the obligations of
the parties. The Contractor will then use standard subcontracts
and/or purchase orders to enter into contracts with the
27
subcontractors and the material suppliers. These contracts are
typically coordinated so as to allow for review of provisions of the
28
Owner-Contractor Agreement. The agreements also coordinate
29
insurance coverage and bonding obligations.
20. The American Institute of Architects, http://www.aia.org (last visited
Nov. 12, 2007).
21. The
Engineer’s
Joint
Contract
Documents
Committee,
http://www.ejcdc.org (last visited Nov. 12, 2007).
22. The Associated General Contractors of America, http://www.agc.org (last
visited Nov. 12, 2007).
23. The Design-Build Institute of America, http://www.dbia.org (last visited
Nov. 12, 2007).
24. See AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOCUMENT A101 (1997), available at
http://www.hepc.wvnet.edu/resources/pmanualforms/ConstructionServices/AIA
A101-97AgreementBetweenOwner&Contractor.pdf.
25. AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOCUMENT A111 (1997).
26. AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOCUMENT A201 (1997), available at
http://www.engin.umich.edu/class/cee431/AIA/05.04.05_A201_SAMPLE_
encrypted.pdf [hereinafter AIA DOCUMENT A201].
27. Id. at art. 5.
28. See id. § 5.3.
29. See id. § 11.1.1.
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On the other side of the transaction, the Owner will enter into
30
an agreement with the Architect—AIA document B141 —and the
Architect will in turn enter into an agreement with its sub31
consultant for the various engineering disciplines. Again, these
agreements are coordinated to allow for a pass-through of the
obligations between the Owner and the Architect and the Architect
and Engineers.
The agreements prepared by the AIA are also themselves
carefully coordinated to allow for clear definition of scope of work
and responsibilities in virtually all areas and phases of the
construction project.
32
For example, the A201 General Conditions covers issues such
as:
•

Ownership and use of drawings, specifications, and
other instruments of service.

•

Information and services required of the Owner.

•

Owner’s right to stop work.

•

Payment of taxes, permits, fees, and notices.

•

Treatment of allowances by the Contractor.

•

Contractor’s construction schedules.

•

Documents and samples required to be present on the
site.

•

Shop drawings, product data, and samples procedures.

•

Royalties, patents, and copyrights.

•

Indemnification (by the Contractor).

30. AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOCUMENT B141 (1997), available at
http://www.designadvisor.org/pdfs/b141.pdf [hereinafter AIA Document B141].
31. Id. at art. 1.1.
32. AIA DOCUMENT A201, supra note 26.
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•

Administration of the contract (by the Architect).

•

Claims and disputes procedures.

•

Claims for additional time.

•

Resolution of claims and disputes.

•

Mediation.

•

Arbitration.

•

Subcontractors.

•

Contingent assignment of subcontracts (effective upon
termination).

•

Changes in the work.

•

Delays and extensions of time.

•

Payments and completion.

•

Certifications for payment.

•

Substantial completion.

•

Partial occupancy or use.

•

Final completion and final payment.

•

Safety precautions and programs.

•

Hazardous materials.

•

Emergencies.

•

Insurance and bonds.
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•

Uncovering and correction of work (either before or
after substantial completion).

•

Acceptance of non-conforming work.

•

Governing law.

•

Successors and assigns.

•

Rights and remedies.

•

Tests and inspections.

•

Commencement of statutory limitation period.

•

Termination or suspension of the contract (both for
cause and for convenience).

States that reject the economic loss doctrine, such as
Minnesota, apparently have overlooked the fact that parties to
construction projects define their obligations in detail in their
contracts. The relationship between design professional, Owner,
Contractor, and other third parties will depend on the nature of
the project.
Traditional construction projects will operate
differently than design-build fast track projects, which will in turn
operate differently than a project utilizing a construction manager.
The parties themselves are best able to determine their needs and
negotiate the terms of their contracts accordingly. General tort law
should not be permitted to tamper with these contractual
relationships.
A careful review of the current standard contracts in the
industry discloses that the standard of care for the design
professional is not defined in the contract. Similarly, the standard
of care for contractors is not specifically defined. This was
intentional on the part of the organizations drafting the contracts
because they wanted those contracts to essentially default to the
standard of care that would exist at the time under the
circumstances and in the specific geographic area. This may have
created confusion for lawyers and the courts dealing in
construction disputes. Since the contract between the Owner and
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the design professional is silent as to the standard of care, the
standard of care is ultimately determined based upon “the exercise
of that skill and judgment which [sic] can reasonably be expected
33
from similarly situated professionals.” This is the same standard
of care that would be used to define the duty owed in a tort action.
Thus, absent a definition of standard of care in the contract, the
standard of care in a contract action and tort action are similarly
defined. As a result, confusion may have ensued as to the standing
of any given construction case as a tort or contract action. The new
AIA B101 Owner-Architect (2007 version) does, for the first time,
contain a definition of the standard of care, which may alleviate
34
this confusion to the extent it existed.
IV. ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE IN MINNESOTA
Based on this foundation of case law and private sector
contract development, Minnesota, until the 1980s, generally
recognized an economic loss doctrine. A review of Minnesota’s
case law on this issue starts with the case of Superwood Corp. v.
35
Siempelkamp Corp. This Minnesota Supreme Court case dealt with
36
a product liability dispute. The plaintiff, Superwood, purchased a
hotplate press manufactured in 1954 by the defendant, G.
37
Siempelkamp. According to the court:
The press operated without problem from 1954 to 1975,
when the cylinder on the hotplate press failed and could
not be repaired. On March 12, 1979, three years after the
cylinder failed, plaintiff brought this Federal District
Court action based on negligence, strict products liability,
38
breach of warranty, and breach of contract.
The damages alleged were all economic loss damages in that
they comprised damage to the press itself and lost profits arising
39
out of the press’s failure to operate. The federal district court
granted the defendant’s summary judgment motion on the

33. City of Mounds View v. Walijarvi, 263 N.W.2d 420, 424 (Minn. 1978).
34. AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOCUMENT B101 § 2.2 (2007). Note that the
new B101 is the new functional equivalent of the old B141. See AIA DOCUMENT
B141, supra note 30.
35. 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 160.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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contract and warranty claims on the grounds that the statute of
40
limitations had run on those claims. The federal district court
then certified three questions of “uncertain” state law to the
41
Minnesota Supreme Court.
The first two questions were as
follows:
(1)
Is the manufacturer of defective equipment
(a press) strictly liable in negligence to the user of the
equipment damaged in its property and business by
negligent product manufacture, inspection, or
installation supervision?
(2)
Is the manufacturer of defective equipment
(a press) strictly liable in tort to the user of the
equipment damaged in its property and business by the
42
product defect?
The court initially observed that “[t]o answer these questions,
[we] must determine whether economic losses arising out of
commercial transactions are recoverable under negligence and
43
strict products liability theories.” The defendant argued that the
44
Minnesota Legislature enacted the Uniform Commercial Code
and that “to allow a tort action would circumvent the system of
45
rights and remedies detailed by the legislature and the UCC.”
The court reviewed one of the most frequently cited cases,
which also serves as a common starting point for discussions of this
46
area of the law, the California case of Seely v. White Motor Co. In
Seely, the plaintiff attempted to recover the cost of repairs to a
defective truck, the purchase price of the truck, and the lost
47
business profits that resulted from the lost usage of the truck. The
California Supreme Court recognized that permitting a strict
products liability theory would undermine the law of sales and
48
would not reflect terms of the contract between the parties. The
Seely court held that economic losses could not be recovered under
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 160–61.
See Act of May 26, 1965, ch. 811, 1965 Minn. Laws 1290.
Superwood, 311 N.W.2d at 161.
Id. (citing Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965)).
Seely, 403 P.2d at 147–48.
Id. at 149.
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49

strict products liability, and also indicated that even in negligence
actions, the manufacturer’s liability does not extend to economic
50
losses.
At that time, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that
“the majority of jurisdictions that have considered this issue have
51
followed the holding in Seely.” Recognizing that this was “a case of
first impression in Minnesota,” the court went on to analyze the
52
interaction of the U.C.C. with tort law and strict liability. The
court recognized that the U.C.C. “clarifies the rights and remedies
of parties to commercial transactions. For example, specific
provisions exist covering warranties, warranty disclaimers, liability
53
limitations, and notice provisions.”
In upholding the economic loss doctrine, Superwood held “that
economic losses that arise out of commercial transactions, except
those involving personal injury or damage to other property, are
not recoverable under the tort theories of negligence or strict
54
products liability.” The court thus recognized that the rights and
remedies established by the U.C.C. should not be disrupted by the
application of tort theories of recovery, at least as to economic
losses arising out of the failure of the product itself. Such loss of
expectation damages are adequately addressed by an action based
upon contract.
In 1984, the Minnesota Court of Appeals decided Zontelli &
55
Sons, Inc. v. City of Nashwauk (Zontelli I). While portions of the
court of appeals’ decision were reversed and remanded by the
subsequent supreme court case Zontelli & Sons v. City of Nashwauk
(Zontelli II), the court of appeals’ decision regarding the nature of
the claim—that is, tort versus contract—was not overturned.
Zontelli was a general contractor who constructed a municipal
56
storm sewer project for the City of Nashwauk. The city’s engineer
substantially underestimated the amount of concrete and other
unsuitable materials that needed removal during construction of

49. Id. at 151.
50. Id.
51. Superwood, 311 N.W.2d at 161.
52. Id. at 161–62.
53. Id. at 162 (citation omitted).
54. Id.
55. 353 N.W.2d 600 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) [hereinafter Zontelli I], overruled in
part by Zontelli & Sons v. City of Nashwauk, 373 N.W.2d 744 (Minn. 1985)
[hereinafter Zontelli II].
56. Zontelli I, 353 N.W.2d at 602.
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57

the street project.
The dispute centered on the amount of
additional costs that would be permitted as a result of the
58
significant difference in quantities. After a lengthy analysis of the
contract provisions, the court of appeals determined that Zontelli
was entitled to costs beyond those allowed under the contract
because the extent and effect of the difference in quantities was so
unusual as to not have been contemplated by the parties at the
59
time of contracting. Of significance, however, are the decisions of
both the court of appeals and, ultimately, the Minnesota Supreme
60
Court, concluding that Zontelli’s claims arose out of the contract.
The trial court previously concluded that the underlying nature of
Zontelli’s claims lay in tort and therefore applied comparative fault
61
principals under Minnesota Statutes section 604.01. The court of
appeals addressed this issue as follows:
While we can understand why the trial court wanted to
apportion fault in this case, apportionment was not
proper. Regardless of the fact that some of Zontelli’s
claims sound in tort, the basis of each claim is rooted in a
contract. The claim of breach of warranty is based on the
estimates included in Zontelli’s contract with the City.
Zontelli’s claim of negligence, a tort claim, requires proof
of the existence of a duty of care flowing from Wallace to
Zontelli. Such a duty, if it exists at all, could only arise
from the contract between Zontelli and the City or the
contract between the City and Wallace. Zontelli’s thirdparty beneficiary claim is dependent upon the contract
62
between the City and Wallace.
63
The supreme court went on to cite Lesmeister v. Dilly, another
case, which held “that it was error to submit the theory of
‘negligent breach’ of contract to the jury, or to allow
apportionment of fault either based on the pure contract or the
64
The Minnesota Supreme
‘negligent breach’ cause of action.”
Court in Zontelli II quickly agreed that the City’s duty to reimburse

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 603; Zontelli II, 373 N.W.2d at 756.
See id.
See id. at 605.
Zontelli II, 373 N.W.2d at 751.
Zontelli I, 353 N.W.2d at 604.
Id.
330 N.W.2d 95 (Minn. 1983).
Id. at 102.
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Zontelli for extra work arose out of contract (not tort) and then
65
analyzed the changed conditions clauses in those contracts.
The economic loss doctrine suffered a fatal blow in the case of
66
Waldor Pump & Equipment Co. v. Orr-Schelen-Mayeron & Assoc., Inc.
Orr-Schelen-Mayeron & Associates (OSM) was an engineering firm
that had prepared specifications for a municipal public works
67
68
project, which included certain pumping equipment. The bid of
Waldor Pump, a subcontractor, had been accepted by the general
contractor of the project, but Waldor’s equipment—the Wilden
Pump—was later rejected by OSM as not conforming to its
69
Waldor Pump later contended that OSM was
specifications.
70
negligent in drafting the specifications. A jury found that OSM
71
was negligent and awarded Waldor Pump $61,834 in damages.
OSM appealed from the judgment, arguing that the trial court
erred in submitting the issue of negligence to the jury because
72
OSM owed no duty of reasonable care to Waldor Pump. Waldor
Pump was a subcontractor on a construction project and would
73
have had no contractual privity with OSM.
This case put the
spotlight on the economic loss doctrine in Minnesota.
The Waldor Pump court first cited City of Mounds View v.
74
Walijarvi for the following:
OSM contends it is not liable in negligence to Waldor
Pump because an engineer owes no duty to anyone absent
a contract. This position is contrary to the prevailing rule
in a majority of jurisdictions, which recognizes the liability
of those rendering “professional” services in situations in
which the professional is negligent in the provision of
75
services.
76
The court continued, citing Larson v. Larson:
The reasonable skill and judgment expected of
professionals must be rendered to those who foreseeably
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Zontelli II, 373 N.W.2d at 751.
386 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
Id. at 376.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
263 N.W.2d 420 (Minn. 1978).
Waldor Pump, 386 N.W.2d at 376–77.
373 N.W.2d 287 (Minn. 1985).
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rely upon the services. Therefore, OSM is liable in
negligence to those who foreseeably rely on its
77
professional services.
Two problems arise with a review of the appellate court’s analysis in
Waldor Pump. First, City of Mounds View, as will be discussed below,
does not stand for the proposition cited by the court of appeals;
second, Larson has no relation whatsoever to architects’ and
engineers’ professional services, and held the opposite, that the
78
“professional” — a police officer—did not owe a duty.
City of Mounds View involved an architect, Walijarvi, who
79
designed an addition to the Mounds View city hall. Shortly after
80
construction, the basement in the city hall building began to leak.
Mr. Walijarvi wrote a letter where he purported to guarantee that
the design of the lower level would remain free of moisture;
however, he also pointed out that damp basements were common
and that the architect had not constructed the building and could
not guarantee that it was built in accordance with the design
81
specifications.
The first issue faced by the Minnesota Supreme Court was
whether the original agreement had been modified to include an
82
The court
express warranty when Walijarvi sent the letter.
dismissed that argument primarily based on the fact that the
original letter written by the city administrator was not in
83
The court then turned its attention to whether an
evidence.
implied warranty of fitness resulted when the architectural services
84
were provided.
The court stated that “[t]he majority position
limits the liability of architects and others rendering ‘professional’
services to those situations in which the professional is negligent in
the provision of his or her services. With respect to architects, the
85
rule was stated as early as 1896 by the Supreme Court of Maine.”
The court refused to extend the doctrine of strict liability to
architects and engineers, instead holding:

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Waldor Pump, 386 N.W.2d at 377 (citations omitted).
Larson, 373 N.W.2d at 288.
263 N.W.2d at 421.
Id.
Id. at 421–22.
Id. at 422.
Id. at 423.
Id.
Id. (referring to Coombs v. Beede, 36 A. 104 (Me. 1896)).
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Because of the inescapable possibility of error which
inures in these services, the law has traditionally required,
not perfect results, but rather the exercise of that skill and
judgment which can be reasonably expected from similar
situated professionals. As we stated in City of Eveleth v.
Ruble:
“One who undertakes to render professional services is
under a duty to the person for whom the service is to be
performed to exercise such care, skill, and diligence as
men in that profession ordinarily exercise under like
86
circumstances.”
Finally, the court in City of Mounds View stated:
[W]hile it is undoubtedly fair to impose strict liability on
manufacturers who have ample opportunity to test their
products for defects before marketing them, the same
cannot be said of architects. Normally, an architect has
but a single chance to create a design for a client which
will produce a defect-free structure. Accordingly, we do
not think it just that architects should be forced to bear
the same burden of liability for their products as that
which has been imposed on manufacturers generally.
For these reasons, we decline to extend the implied
warranty/strict liability doctrine to cover vendors of
professional services. Our conclusion does not, of course,
preclude the city from pursuing its standard malpractice
action against the architects and proving that the
basement area of the new addition was negligently
87
designed.
Therefore, City of Mounds View stands for the proposition that
strict liability in tort should not be extended to the Architect in that
case, but, of course, the City, having privity of contract with the
Architect, could pursue a breach of contract action against that
88
Architect. The court does not further explain what it means by
Mounds View’s right to pursue its “standard malpractice action
89
against the architects.” Thus, it is questionable whether the court
86. Id. at 424 (quoting City of Eveleth v. Ruble, 302 Minn. 249, 253, 225 N.W.2d
521, 524 (1974)) (citation omitted). Note that the City of Eveleth specifically held
that the Architect is “under a duty to the person for whom the service is to be
performed” and does not extend liability to parties not in privity with the Architect
or Engineer. City of Eveleth, 302 Minn. at 253, 225 N.W.2d at 524.
87. City of Mounds View, 263 N.W.2d at 425.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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intended to conclude that a breach of contract action would be
inadequate. This statement appears to be dicta intended to
reference the fact that Mounds View had a right to sue for damages
arising out of Walijarvi’s provision of services inconsistent with the
standard of care. Minnesota has clearly recognized that the
retention of an Architect is a matter of contract and the duties and
limitations of the Architect’s services are described in the
90
contract.
Thus, the first case cited by the court of appeals to
support its decision in Waldor Pump appears to stand for the
opposite proposition to that advanced in Waldor Pump.
The court’s reliance on Larson is also misguided. In Larson, a
police officer stopped an intoxicated driver for speeding and found
91
marijuana and liquor containers in the vehicle. During arrest, the
92
driver threatened that he would “get” the officer’s house. About
two months later, the officer was selected to attend the Minnesota
Police and Peace Officers Association Convention in Grand Rapids,
93
Minnesota, and this fact was advertised in the newspaper. The
police officer asked his brother, respondent Larson, to look after
94
his home while he was gone. He did not tell his brother about the
95
driver’s threat from approximately two months earlier. Shortly
thereafter, the respondent entered the house and was blown out
the door by an explosion and blast of flame; he sustained personal
96
injuries as a result.
Respondent Larson sued Officer Larson for negligence,
claiming that Officer Larson should have warned him of the threat
97
to his house. The jury found both police officer and respondent
negligent, declaring the police officer seventy-five percent
98
negligent and respondent twenty-five percent negligent.
The
police officer appealed, asserting that he had no duty to warn his
99
brother of a “vague threat received some two months” earlier.
Larson held that because “it was so speculative and unforeseeable

90. Moundsview Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Buetow & Assocs., Inc., 253 N.W.2d 836
(1977) (citing Kostohryz v. McGuire, 298 Minn. 513, 212 N.W.2d 850 (1973)).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 289.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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that the threat would mature into harm, we conclude that the trial
court should have held this as a matter of law that appellant had no
100
duty to warn of such unforeseeable speculative danger.”
This case dealt with personal injury, not economic loss.
Furthermore, the basis for the decision in Larson had nothing to do
101
with the provision of a professional service. Larson simply stands
for the proposition that the existence of a legal duty is an issue for
102
Still, even on that
the court to determine as a matter of law.
point, the court stated that “although we have stated that in close
cases foreseeability may be for a jury resolution, the foreseeability
issue in the instant case was clear and should have been decided by
103
the court as a matter of law.”
The Minnesota Court of Appeals in Waldor Pump quoted
Larson for the proposition that “the reasonable skill and judgment
expected of professionals must be rendered to those who
104
foreseeably rely upon the services.” Larson, however, simply does
105
Thus, it is difficult to determine
not stand for that proposition.
how the court in Waldor Pump made the quantum leap from
Superwood and its embrace of the economic loss doctrine to
rejection of the economic loss doctrine in Waldor Pump.
In its defense, the court of appeals in Waldor Pump addressed
106
the Superwood decision. The court first determined that:
[E]conomic losses are those resulting from the failure of a
product performed to the level expected by the buyer.
Minneapolis Soc’y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assoc. Architects,
Inc. Waldor Pump’s damages resulted not from failure of
a product, but from negligent provision of engineering
services.
Superwood does not apply to commercial
transactions involving the rendition of professional
services if the transaction was not governed by the UCC.
Valley
Farmers’
Elevator
v.
Lindsay
Bros.
Co. We do not read Superwood to limit the legal remedies

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. (citation omitted).
104. Waldor Pump & Equipment Co. v. Orr-Schelen-Mayeron & Assoc., Inc.,
386 N.W.2d 375, 377 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
105. See supra notes 91-103 and accompanying text.
106. Waldor Pump, 386 N.W.2d at 377–78.
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of individuals economically injured by the negligent
107
rendition of professional services.
In this statement, the court first relied on Minneapolis Society of
108
The Minnesota
Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Associates Architects.
Supreme Court in that case did not analyze whether economic loss
109
could result from the provision of engineering services.
The
court simply stated:
Generally, “economic loss” has been defined as resulting
from the failure of the product to perform to the level
expected by the buyer and commonly has been measured
by the cost of repairing or replacing the product and the
consequent loss of profits, or by the diminution in value
of the product because it does not work for the general
purposes for which it was manufactured and sold. The
damages sought in this case by MSFA for removal and
replacement of the brick and other consequential loss fall
squarely within this “economic loss” definition. As such,
they were recoverable in contract, if at all. Since the trial
court ruled there was no breach of an express warranty
and the jury found no breach of implied warranties, the
110
rule of Superwood precludes their recovery in this case.
Further, the court held:
“[E]conomic losses” that arise out of commercial
transactions, except those involving personal injury or loss
to other property, are not recoverable under the tort
theories of negligence or strict product liability. Damage
to the brick on MSFA’s curtain wall construction was not
damage to “other property,” but such damages were
recoverable, if at all, under the “expectation-bargain”
protection of contract law . . . . In any event, we further
hold that Hanley owed no tort duty to warn MSFA or its
architects and construction engineers of proper design of
the building walls because the architects and engineers
knew, or should have known, the danger of spalling if a

107. Id. (citing Minneapolis Soc’y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assoc. Architects,
Inc., 354 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1984); Valley Farmers’ Elevator v. Lindsay Bros. Co.,
380 N.W.2d 874 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)) (citations omitted).
108. Minneapolis Soc’y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assoc. Architects, Inc., 354
N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1984), overruled in part by Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d
683, 687 (Minn. 1990).
109. See id.
110. Id. at 820–21 (citations omitted).
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recognized proper wall design was not employed in this
111
severe weather area.
The court in Waldor Pump attempted to draw a distinction
112
between products and the provision of engineering services.
However, the “economic losses” arising out of the provision of the
architect’s services typically will arise out of the failure of
components of a building—that is, products—to perform as the
113
Owner desires. In contrast, the court in Minneapolis Society of Fine
Arts drew the proper distinction between property damage and
“damage to other property.” “‘[E]conomic losses’ that arise out of
commercial transactions, except those involving personal injury or loss to
other property, are not recoverable under the tort theories of
114
negligence or strict product liability.”
Stated differently, the
court held that economic losses resulting from a personal injury or
loss to other property caused by the design or construction work
itself are recoverable under tort theories of negligence or strict
product liability.
Waldor Pump then relied upon Valley Farmers’ Elevator v. Lindsay
115
116
Bros. Co. for the proposition that Superwood does not apply to
commercial transactions involving the performance of professional
117
services if the transactions are not governed by the U.C.C.
As
stated in Waldor Pump, “we do not read Superwood to limit the legal
remedies of individuals economically injured by the negligent
118
Valley Farmers’ Elevator
rendition of professional services.”
observed that Superwood did not address professional services

111. Id. at 822.
112. Waldor Pump, 386 N.W.2d at 377. See Minneapolis Soc’y of Fine Arts, 354
N.W.2d at 822 (distinguishing between absolute product warrantors, architects
and experienced engineers).
113. See generally Barrett, supra note 1, at 914-17 (discussing the “sudden and
dangerous” test, which permits recovery in tort for damage to the work product
itself).
114. Minneapolis Soc’y of Fine Arts, 354 N.W.2d at 822 (emphasis added) (relying
on Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Minn. 1981)
for the economic loss doctrine).
115. 380 N.W.2d 874 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), aff’d, 398 N.W.2d 553 (Minn.
1987), overruled in part by Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683, 687 (Minn.
1990).
116. 311 N.W.2d 159, overruled in part by Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d
683 (Minn. 1990). The Hapka court ruled that “[t]he Uniform Commercial Code
controls exclusively with respect to damages in a commercial transaction which
involves property damage only.” Hapka, 458 N.W.2d at 683.
117. Waldor Pump, 386 N.W.2d at 378.
118. Id.
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because the question certified in Superwood only addressed a
119
Relying on the Illinois case of Rosos Litho
defective product.
120
Supply Corp v. Hanson, the court observed that tort actions should
be allowed against service providers—here Architects and
Engineers—since the U.C.C. does not apply and thus a plaintiff
121
would have no warranty remedy for economic loss. Of course this
analysis ignores the contracts between the parties and assumes that
a breach of contract action would be inadequate to address the
plaintiff’s injury. However, even with this observation, Valley
Farmers’ Elevator determined that the plaintiff’s action involved
122
primarily the sale of goods and was governed by the U.C.C. The
court explained that “[t]o allow Valley Farmers’ to recast its claim
under a negligence theory and thus evade the limitations provision
of the U.C.C. would undermine the U.C.C. in the manner that
123
Superwood was intended to prevent.”
The Minnesota Supreme Court did not recognize the fact that
Waldor Pump had adequate remedies under Minnesota law to file a
124
bid protest against the owner.
The owner, then in privity of
contract with the engineer, could have brought an action against
125
the engineer.
To fully understand Waldor Pump, one needs to look behind
the scenes at what Waldor Pump accomplished by circumventing
the economic loss doctrine. The bid that Waldor Pump submitted
126
was for a municipal public-works project, for which Minnesota
127
The bid protest statute specifically
statutes govern bid protests.
would have allowed Waldor Pump to recover only the cost of
128
preparing the bid.
This is because the public bidding process
exists for the benefit of the public and is designed to assure the
lowest priced products, equipment, and labor that can meet the
129
design requirements. Due to the bidding statute, no direct action
could have been maintained against the city for anything other

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Valley Farmers’ Elevator, 380 N.W.2d at 877.
462 N.E.2d 566, 572–73 (1984).
Valley Farmers’ Elevator, 380 N.W.2d at 877-78.
Id. at 879.
Id.
Waldor Pump, 386 N.W.2d at 377.
Id. at 376–77.
Id. at 376.
MINN. STAT. § 471.345 (2006 & Supp. 2007).
Id. at subdiv. 14.
73A C.J.S. Public Contracts § 14 (2002).
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than the cost of preparing the bid. Waldor Pump, by convincing
the Minnesota Court of Appeals that the economic loss doctrine
did not apply, was allowed to circumvent Minnesota bidding law
131
and launch a direct action against the engineer, OSM.
Interestingly, the case states that “[t]he jury also found that OSM
had violated Minnesota Public Bidding Law, but that the violation
132
was not a direct cause of Waldor’s damages.”
Notably, in OSM’s professional judgment, the coil spring
133
feature at issue in the case had a rational purpose.
In order to
prevail on a bid dispute under Minnesota law, Waldor Pump would
have to show that OSM prepared specifications excluding all but
134
As noted above, the jury found that
one type of product.
although OSM violated Minnesota public bidding law, that
135
The
violation was not a direct cause of Waldor’s damages.
analysis should have concluded at that point. To allow otherwise
permits the selfsame evils that concerned Justice Cardozo in
Ultramares; that is to say, OSM was exposed to liability in an
“indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an
136
indeterminate class.”
IV. TREATMENT OF THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE IN OTHER
STATES
Other states have treated the economic loss doctrine
differently. Indeed, one of the rationales behind the court’s
decision in Waldor Pump was that “[The defendant’s] position [was]
contrary to the prevailing rule in a majority of jurisdictions, which
recognized the liability of those rendering ‘professional’ services in
130. See § 471.345 subdiv. 14.
131. Waldor Pump, 386 N.W.2d at 377.
132. Id. at 376. The Waldor Pump case provides additional insight as to the
facts underlying the dispute:
The project’s specifications require that the pump be “self-priming”
and use a “coil spring.” The Wilden pump did not have a coil spring,
but it was self-priming. Waldor Pump claimed the only functional
purpose of a coil spring is to render the pump self-priming. OSM
contends that a coil spring also “scours” or dislodges sludge from
clogged pipelines. Waldor Pump’s expert witness, Garr Jones, testified
at trial that the Wilden pump conformed in all material aspects to the
specifications and there was no reason to reject it. Id. at 376 n.1.
133. Id. at 376.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931).
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situations in which the professional is negligent in the provision of
137
services.” That is not the case; according to an article published
in 1991 in Construction Lawyer, “the economic loss rule is not an
outmoded doctrine that should be applied only in product liability
138
cases.”
In fact, the economic loss rule “continues to grow in vitality and
139
In 1985,
is now accepted in at least twenty-three jurisdictions.”
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that “[t]he push to delete
the restrictions on recovery for an economic loss lost its support
and by the early 1940’s [sic] had failed . . . . [I]t is an old sword
140
that plaintiffs have here picked up.”
Many jurisdictions hold that the economic loss rule bars
recovery under a tort theory when the parties are acting under a
141
contract and economic losses are the only damages. The Nevada
Supreme Court discussed the application of the economic loss

137. Waldor Pump, 386 N.W.2d at 376-77.
138. Luther P. House, Jr. & Hubert J. Bell, The Economic Loss Rule: A Fair
Balancing of Interests, CONSTRUCTION LAW., at 29 (1991).
139. Id.
140. Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1023 (5th Cir.
1985) (citation omitted).
141. See Alpine Bank v. Hubbell, 506 F. Supp. 2d 388 (D. Colo. 2007) (stating
that Colorado's economic loss rule mandates that “a party suffering only economic
loss from the breach of an express or implied contractual duty may not assert a
tort claim for such a breach absent an independent duty of care from tort law”); In
re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., 504 F. Supp. 2d 287 (S.D. Ohio. 2007); Cont’l
Airlines, Inc. v. Mundo Travel Corp., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1069 (E.D. Cal. 2006)
(stating that economic loss rule bars recovery in tort for the breach of a duty that
is founded solely on the basis of a contract); RLI Ins. Co. v. John H. Hampshire
Inc., 461 F. Supp. 2d 364 (D. Md. 2006) (finding that contractor’s surety could not
sue university’s architect in tort for allegedly failing to detect that contractor was
installing wall panels incorrectly); Sofi Classic v. Hurowitz, 444 F. Supp. 2d 231
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); Waytec Elecs. Corp. v. Rohm & Haas Elec. Materials, L.L.C., 459
F. Supp. 2d 480 (W.D. Va. 2006); Millenkamp v. Davisco Foods Int’l., Inc., 391 F.
Supp. 2d 872 (D. Idaho 2005); Lexington Ins. Co. v. W. Roofing Co., 316 F. Supp.
2d 1142 (D. Kan. 2004) (stating that under Kansas law, economic loss doctrine is
designed to preclude plaintiffs from circumventing the law of contracts and
seeking to recover in tort for what is in essence a claim for breach of contract);
Me. Rubber Int’l v. Envtl. Mgmt. Group, 298 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D. Me. 2004); AllIowa Contracting Co. v. Linear Dynamics, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 2d 969 (N.D. Iowa
2003); City Express, Inc. v. Express Partners, 959 P.2d 836 (Haw. 1998); Young v.
City of Plaquemine, 818 So. 2d 892 (La. Ct. App. 2002); Calloway v. City of Reno,
993 P.2d 1259, 1262 (Nev. 2000); Plourde Sand & Gravel v. JGI E. Inc., 917 A.2d
1250 (N.H. 2007); Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., No. 05-0832,
2007 WL 2459193 (Tex. 2007); Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 70 P.3d 1 (Utah
2003); Springfield Hydroelectric Co. v. Copp, 779 A.2d 67 (Vt. 2001); Alejandre v.
Bull, 153 P.3d 864 (Wash. 2007).
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doctrine in a class action lawsuit brought by townhouse owners
against a real estate developer, a contractor, subcontractors, and
142
the city, which arose from alleged defects in a townhouse
143
The plaintiffs complained “that
development in Reno, Nevada.
their homes were built with defective roofing and siding that was
144
responsible for extensive water damage from rain and snow.”
The claims included breach of express and implied warranties,
145
After
negligence, strict liability, fraud, and misrepresentation.
some of the defendants settled, the district court granted the
146
remaining defendants summary judgment.
On appeal, the
Nevada Supreme Court upheld application of the economic loss
doctrine because the defective construction created only economic
147
loss. Refusing to apply a foreseeability exception, the court stated
that “foreseeability of damages plays no role with respect to the
economic loss doctrine. Purely economic losses fall outside the
148
purview of tort recovery, even if such losses are foreseeable.” In
another instance, a Virginia court held that “[p]ursuant to
Virginia’s economic loss rule, losses suffered as a result of the
breach of a duty assumed only by agreement, rather than a duty
149
imposed by law, remain the sole province of the law of contracts.”
Wisconsin recently applied the economic loss rule to
150
construction cases in 1325 North Van Buren, LLC v. T-3 Group, Ltd.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin observed that three principles
underlie application of the economic loss doctrine. These include:
(1) to maintain the fundamental distinction between
tort and contract law;
(2) to protect commercial parties’ freedom to allocate
economic risk by contract; and

142. Calloway v. City of Reno, 993 P.2d at 1262.
143. Id. at 1261.
144. Id. at 1261–62.
145. Id. at 1262.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1270.
148. Id.
149. Waytec Elecs. Corp. v. Rohm & Haas Elec. Materials, LLC, 459 F. Supp. 2d
480, 482–83 (W.D. Va. 2006).
150. 716 N.W.2d 822 (Wis. 2006).
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(3) to encourage the party best situated to assess the
risk of economic loss, the commercial purchaser, to
151
assume, allocate or insure against that risk.
A.

Florida’s Treatment of the Economic Loss Doctrine

One particularly interesting consideration of the economic
loss doctrine arose in 1993 when the Florida Supreme Court
examined the doctrine in Casa Clara Condominium Ass’n v. Charlie
152
The defendant, Charlie Toppino & Sons,
Toppino & Sons, Inc.
Inc., supplied concrete for numerous construction projects in
Monroe County; the case involved homeowners who were suing the
concrete supplier under a negligence theory for purely economic
153
losses. The concrete allegedly contained a high salt content that
154
led to rusting of the reinforcing steel in the concrete.
The
plaintiffs were condominium owners whose property suffered from
badly deteriorating concrete, to the point that it was cracking and
155
breaking off the building. The court squarely addressed the issue
of whether the homeowners could pursue a direct negligence
156
action against the concrete supplier for purely economic losses.
The Florida Supreme Court started with an analysis of the
157
economic loss rule set out in Seely v. White Motor Co. The analysis
of Seely led the court to define economic losses as:
damages for inadequate value, costs of repair and
replacement of the defective product, or consequent loss
of profits—without any claim of personal injury or
damage to other property . . . . In other words, economic
losses are ‘disappointed economic expectations’ which are
158
protected by contract law rather than tort law.
The court recognized the basic difference between contract
law, which protects expectations, and tort law, which determines
159
the duty owed to an injured party. The court went on to explain
151. Id. at 831 (quoting Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids, Inc., 573
N.W.2d 842, 842 (Wis. 1998)).
152. 620 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1993).
153. Id. at 1245.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1245–46 (quoting Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151 (Cal.
1965)).
158. Id. at 1246.
159. Id.
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that “[f]or recovery in tort there must be a showing of harm above
and beyond disappointed expectations. A buyer’s desire to enjoy
the benefit of his bargain is not an interest that tort law
160
traditionally protects.”
Thus, the Florida Supreme Court recognized that the
161
homeowners were seeking purely economic damages.
No one
sustained any physical injuries and no other property, other than
the structures built with the supplier’s concrete, sustained any
162
damage.
The Florida Supreme Court continued its analysis by reviewing
163
The court
strict liability in a product manufacturing setting.
recognized that a manufacturer or producer of goods was liable
under a theory of strict liability because “public policy demands
that responsibility be fixed where it will most effectively reduce the
hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach
164
the market.”
The court further recognized that the “basic
function of tort law is to shift the burden of loss from the injured
plaintiff to one who is at fault . . . or to one who is better able to
165
bear the loss and prevent its occurrence.”
Finally, the Florida Supreme Court recognized that the
homeowners could rely on statutory warranties as well as a duty on
166
the part of sellers to disclose defects. Moreover, the homeowners
could also rely on the opportunity to inspect houses for defects
167
before purchase.
The court determined that the various
remedies available to the homeowners “coupled with homebuyers’
power to bargain over price, [were] . . . sufficient when compared
with the mischief that could be caused by allowing tort recovery for
168
purely economic losses.” The court then held:
Therefore, we again “hold contract principals more
appropriate than tort principals for recovering economic
loss without an accompanying physical injury or property

160. Id. (citing Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 441 N.E.2d. 324, 327 (Ill. 1982))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. (citing E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858,
866 (1986)).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1247 (alteration in original).
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damage.” If we held otherwise, “contract law would drown
in a sea of tort.” We refuse to hold that homeowners are
169
not subject to the economic loss rule.
VI. MINNESOTA CASES FOLLOWING WALDOR PUMP
Like other states, Minnesota continued to grapple with the
economic loss doctrine, a fact demonstrated by two 1987 cases. On
August 7, 1987, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided McCarthy
170
St. Peter Creamery, Inc. (the
Well Co. v. St. Peter Creamery, Inc.
Creamery) hired McCarthy Well Company, Inc. (McCarthy) to
171
restore the Creamery’s artesian well to its original capacity.
McCarthy proceeded with the work, pulling a copper liner out of
the well casing and attempting to clean sand out of the bottom of
172
The attempt, however, was unsuccessful. McCarthy
the well.
then exploded dynamite at the bottom of the well, increasing the
173
McCarthy billed the Creamery for $34,573.20,
flow of water.
174
which included a charge of $8,329.45 for a new pump.
The
Creamery did not pay the entire bill and McCarthy commenced
175
suit to recover the balance. Shortly after the commencement of
the lawsuit, the pump’s shaft broke three times, and the Creamery
subsequently hired a different company to install a new pump,
176
A later inspection revealed a hole in the well
which also broke.
casing, and, as a result, the Creamery dug a new well and installed a
177
new pump.
The court first analyzed whether the Superwood decision would
apply “so as to bar the [C]reamery from recovering economic losses
178
under a negligence theory.”
Here, the Creamery and McCarthy
entered into a written contract to perform the work, which was in
the form of an acknowledgement-of-order form sent to the
179
Creamery. “The reverse side of the form contained an extensive
listing of terms and conditions, one of which provided that the
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. (citations omitted).
410 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. 1987).
Id. at 313.
Id. at 314.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 315.
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‘contractor shall not be liable for . . . . Any other damage or liability
of any nature whatsoever arising or growing out of the Contractor’s
180
work hereunder.’”
A jury found that McCarthy was responsible for seventy-five
181
The Minnesota
percent of the Creamery’s claimed damages.
Court of Appeals upheld this decision and found the placement of
the exculpatory clause in the contract was unconscionable and/or
invalid because it was not limited to liability for acts of
182
negligence.
At the time, under Minnesota Statutes section 337.02, the
indemnification clause was unenforceable:
An indemnification agreement contained in, or executed
in connection with, a building and construction contract
is unenforceable except to the extent that the underlying
injury or damage is attributable to the negligent or
otherwise wrongful act or omission, including breach of a
specific contractual duty, of the promisor or the
promisor’s independent contractors, agents, employees,
183
or delegatees.
Thus, because the indemnity clause was unenforceable under
Minnesota law, nothing prevented the Creamery from pursuing a
breach of contract claim under its contract with McCarthy.
Instead, the court analyzed whether the Superwood decision
would apply so as to bar the Creamery’s ability to bring a
negligence action against McCarthy, even though it appears there
184
was no reason to do so.
The supreme court first observed that,
“[a]lthough we did not define ‘commercial transaction,’ a review of
our decision in Superwood shows that, as used in Superwood, a
‘commercial transaction’ is a transaction governed by Article 2 of
185
the Uniform Commercial Code . . . .” The court then articulated
that “[t]he Superwood rule is premised on the existence of certain
rights and remedies provided for in the U.C.C.. . . . To allow tort
liability in commercial transactions would totally emasculate [the
186
warranty and liability provisions] of the U.C.C.”
The court
180. Id. (omission in original).
181. Id. at 313.
182. Id.
183. MINN. STAT. § 337.02 (1986).
184. McCarthy, 410 N.W.2d at 314.
185. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. ch. 336 (1986)).
186. Id. at 314-15 (quoting Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311
N.W.2d 159, 162 (Minn. 1981) (alteration in original).
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explained that “[t]he rationale behind the Superwood rule is that a
recognition of tort actions in cases under the U.C.C. would upset
the remedies contained in the U.C.C.; when the rationale is not
applicable, i.e., when the U.C.C. does not apply, there is no reason
187
for the Superwood rule to apply.” The court concluded by stating,
“[a]ccordingly, we hold that ‘commercial transaction,’ as that
phrase is used in Superwood, means a transaction governed by the
U.C.C. When the U.C.C. does not apply, the transaction is not a
188
‘commercial transaction,’ and the Superwood rule does not apply.”
Thus, McCarthy recognized that the statutory U.C.C. provisions
should not be “emasculated” by converting the case to a tort action.
The court opted not to analyze—as many other jurisdictions have—
the logic behind the Superwood rule as it would apply to
construction projects. Just as with the U.C.C., which “clarifies the
189
rights and remedies of parties to commercial transactions,” the
contracts between the parties in a commercial construction project
also clarify the rights and remedies of the parties to commercial
transactions. Why should the contractually agreed upon rights and
remedies in a commercial construction project be ignored and yet
the rights and remedies to commercial transactions as described in
the U.C.C. be allowed special protection? Why is contract law
allowed to drown in a sea of tort?
VII.

REVIVAL OF THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE

A. Briefly, the Prichard Bros. Cases
In 1987, at the time the Minnesota Supreme Court heard
McCarthy Well, the Minnesota Court of Appeals heard Prichard Bros.
190
The decision by the court of
v. Grady Co. (Prichard Bros. I).
appeals resulted in a short-lived resuscitation of the economic loss
doctrine as it applied to design professionals, but the decision was
191
reversed the following year by the Minnesota Supreme Court.
This case arose out of the addition and remodeling of a school
building for Independent School District No. 353 in Karlstad,

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
1988).

Id. at 315.
Id.
Id. at 314 (quoting Superwood, 311 N.W.2d at 162).
407 N.W.2d 423 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
Prichard Bros., Inc. v. Grady Co. (Prichard II), 428 N.W.2d 391 (Minn.
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192

Minnesota.
The School District and Grady executed a standard
AIA contract as Owner and Architect, incorporating the AIA
193
document governing general conditions. Prichard Brothers, Inc.
was the successful low bidder as general contractor on the project
and also entered into a Standard AIA Contract with the School
District for the general construction of the project, incorporating
194
the AIA A201 General Conditions. Due to a series of delays, the
project was not completed on time and Prichard Brothers
commenced a negligence action against Grady to recover increased
195
costs and lost earnings allegedly caused by the delays. The School
196
Trial proceeded on
District was later brought into the action.
three counts: (1) Architect’s negligence against Grady; (2) agency
as to Grady; and (3) a claim against the School District for the
197
“By special verdict, the jury found
contract balance of $25,465.
that both Prichard Brothers and Grady had been negligent, [and]
that Grady was not acting as an agent of the School District at the
198
time of its negligence . . . .” Prichard Brothers was entitled to no
199
damages on the contract balance of $25,465.
Liability was
apportioned between Prichard Brothers (thirty-six percent) and
200
The special verdict form indicated
Grady (sixty-four percent).
that Prichard Brothers suffered damages of $257,940, $165,081 “of
201
which ‘were the direct results of the negligence of [Grady]. . . .’”
Judgment was subsequently entered for Prichard Brothers against
202
Grady in the amount of $165,081.
The single issue analyzed by the appellate court was whether
the trial court properly allowed the case to proceed on a
203
negligence theory.
The 1987 Prichard Bros. I court of appeals
decision is significant because it is one of the few Minnesota
decisions that attempts to analyze fully the economic loss
204
The court started by identifying Prichard Brothers’
doctrine.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Prichard Bros. I, 407 N.W.2d at 424.
Id.; AIA DOCUMENT A201, supra note 26.
Prichard Bros. I, 407 N.W.2d at 424.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 425.
Id.
Id.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id.
Id.
See id. at 426 (discussing the inapplicability of tort theories to disputes
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negligence claims against Grady that related to “1) preparation of
the plans and specifications for a roof expansion joint and finish
hardware; 2) interpretation of specifications and response to shop
205
drawings submitted; and 3) inspection of the project site.”
The
damages awarded were for delays allegedly caused by Grady’s
206
negligent interpretation of the plans and shop drawings.
The
court first quoted D & A Development Co. v. Butler by stating that
“[t]o prevail in tort, it was necessary for Prichard Brothers to
establish that Grady breached ‘some duty imposed by law, not
207
Tort duties are independent
merely one imposed by contract.’”
of contract. The again referenced D & A Development Co.:
The fundamental difference between tort and contract
lies in the nature of the interest protected. Tort actions
are created to protect the interest in freedom from
various kinds of harm. The duties of conduct which give
rise to them are imposed by law, and are based primarily
upon social policy, and not necessarily upon the will or
the intention of the parties. . . . Contract actions are
created to protect the interest in having promises
performed. Contact obligations are imposed because of
208
conduct of the parties manifesting consent. . . .
The court of appeals then got to the heart of the matter: “A
definite conflict exists between tort and contract principles in the
area of construction litigation. At least one commentator has
concluded that tort theories are inappropriate to resolution of
these disputes, particularly where the parties’ duties are imposed by
209
contract and represent negotiated limitations and remedies.”
The court recognized that the Minnesota Supreme Court “never
where the parties’ duties are imposed by contract and represent negotiated
limitations and remedies, and distinguishing between economic losses and injury
to people and property).
205. Id. at 425.
206. Id.
207. Id. (quoting D & A Dev. Co. v. Butler, 357 N.W.2d 156, 158 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1984) (quoting Keiper v. Anderson, 138 Minn. 392, 398, 165 N.W. 237, 238
(1917))).
208. Id. at 425–26 (citing D & A Dev. Co., 357 N.W.2d at 158 (quoting W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 92 at 613 (4th ed. 1971) (alteration in
original)).
209. Id. at 426. See Martha C. Coleman, Liability of Design Professionals for
Negligent Design and Project Management, 33 TORT & INS. L.J. 923, 934–36 (1998)
(citing Espel, supra note 3, at 132) (asserting that to permit parties to ignore
privity requirements increases the likelihood that the wrong party will bear the
loss).
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squarely decided whether these types of claims for economic loss
involving design professionals sound[ed] in contract or tort,” but
that the court had been “disinclined to allow tort theories to
210
supersede rules of contract law in other commercial settings.”
Prichard Bros. I further observed that “[r]ecent cases have rejected
negligence or strict liability theories [for] the sale of goods and the
provision of services [] involved, and have held that such cases are
governed by the Uniform Commercial Code and the principles of
211
Superwood.”
The court was influenced by the fact that “[a]t various times
during [the] proceedings, both Grady and the school district [had]
argued that the gravamen of the complaint [is] strictly contractual
and that the Prichard Brothers should not be allowed to convert
212
[the] contract claim into a tort action.” The trial court rejected
213
these arguments based on Waldor Pump.
Recognizing the
conflict, the court of appeals observed in Waldor Pump that “a
design engineer owed a duty to a subcontractor to reasonably draft
and interpret project specifications, and that the engineer could be
214
liable in negligence to that subcontractor . . . .” The subcontract
was considered “a third party who foreseeably relied on its
215
professional services.”
216
The court distinguished D & A Development Co. “on the basis
that it only alleged breach of a contractual duty to complete plans
217
by a specified date, while the engineer in Waldor Pump performed

210. Prichard Bros. I, 407 N.W.2d at 426. See also Superwood Corp. v.
Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Minn. 1981) (holding that “economic
losses that arise out of commercial transactions, except those involving personal
injury or damage to other property, are not recoverable under the tort theories of
negligence or strict products liability.”).
211. Prichard Bros. I, 407 N.W.2d at 426. See also Valley Farmers’ Elevator v.
Lindsay Bros. Co., 398 N.W.2d 553, 556–57 (Minn. 1987) (holding that the
transaction was governed by Superwood and the U.C.C.), overruled by Hapka v.
Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683, 687 (Minn. 1990); McCarthy Well Co. v. St. Peter
Creamery, Inc., 389 N.W.2d 514, 517–18 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that
Superwood does not preclude the recovery of economic losses), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part by McCarthy Well Co. v. St. Peter Creamery, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 312 (Minn.
1987).
212. Prichard Bros. I, 407 N.W.2d at 426.
213. Id. (citing Waldor Pump & Equip. Co. v. Orr-Schelen-Mayeron & Assocs.,
Inc., 386 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
214. Id. (construing Waldor Pump, 386 N.W.2d at 377).
215. Id.
216. D & A Dev. Co. v. Butler, 357 N.W.2d 156 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
217. Waldor Pump, 386 N.W.2d 375.
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its contract but breached a tort duty owed to draft specifications in
218
The court aptly observed that
a professional manner.”
“[a]lthough Waldor Pump expressly states that a contract existed
between the subcontractor and the general contractor [which]
implies that a contract [] existed between the general contractor
and the city and [also] between the city and the engineer, those
219
contracts were not mentioned further.”
Accordingly, the court of appeals found that the school
district’s argument that Prichard Brothers’ claim stemmed from
220
contract was distinguishable based upon the facts of this case.
The court of appeals defined Grady’s duties by reference to the
terms of the contract and found that Prichard Brothers’ claim was
221
based on a breach of those contractual duties.
The court of
appeals declined to read Waldor Pump as holding that a cause of
action necessarily exists in negligence where the parties’ duties and
222
remedies are imposed by contract.
Thus, the court of appeals held as a matter of law that the case
223
was governed by contract rather than tort law.
It was error to
allow Prichard Brothers to circumvent its contract with the school
district based on a vicarious liability or agency theory. It was also
error to hold Grady liable in tort where any duty he owed to
Prichard Brothers was imposed by contract.
The court of appeals could have pointed out that the
framework for Prichard Brothers’ claim for delays and additional
costs was contained in its contract with the school district. The AIA
General Conditions would have contained dispute resolution
procedures, claim procedures, formulas, and processes for the
calculation of additional costs and a timeframe for making such
claims.
The court of appeals, however, did not analyze the various
224
For instance, it
provisions of the AIA General Conditions.
identified that:
[b]y the plain language of the contract in this case, Grady
is not liable for any interpretation rendered in good faith

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Prichard Bros. I, 407 N.W.2d at 426.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 427.
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which [sic] is consistent with the intent of and reasonably
inferable from the contract. Our review of the record
reveals no evidence that would suggest that Grady did not
225
act in good faith.
The court also observed that no “evidence to suggest that Grady’s
interpretations were inconsistent with the terms of the contract”
226
existed. Thus, the court of appeals in Prichard Bros. I upheld the
economic loss doctrine and did not permit a negligence action by
the General Contractor against the Architect so as to defeat the
227
economic loss rule.
This decision analyzed and properly
recognized the sanctity of the contractual scheme entered into
228
between the Owner, Architect, and General Contractor.
Prichard Brothers appealed the court of appeals’ decision to
229
In its short decision, the
the Minnesota Supreme Court.
Minnesota Supreme Court, without any real analysis, overturned
230
Prichard Bros. I and dealt a blow to the economic loss doctrine.
After discussing the decision in Prichard Bros. I, the Minnesota
Supreme Court held:
It is our view that the McCarthy decision, to the effect that
Superwood does not bar negligence recovery in service
transactions, is dispositive and that the appellant
Prichard’s claim against Grady is not barred. It is
unnecessary to determine the contractual relationship, if
any, between Prichard and Grady and the “potential
contract claims,” if any, which Prichard may have against
231
Grady.
The Prichard Bros. cases are quite significant. To begin,
Prichard Bros. I is important because the court of appeals—and the
parties arguing the case—took the time to analyze the contract
scheme that existed between the Owner, the contractors, and the
design professionals. The court of appeals recognized that the

225. Id.
226. Id. at 428.
227. See id. at 427–28 (stating that there is no liability for any good faith
interpretation reasonably inferred from the contract); see also id. at 428 n.2
(reasoning that the jury instructions wrongly commingled the concepts of bad
faith and negligence).
228. Id. at 424.
229. Prichard Bros. II, 428 N.W.2d 391 (Minn. 1988).
230. Id. at 392.
231. Id. (referencing McCarthy Well Co. v. St. Peter Creamery, 410 N.W.2d 312
(Minn. 1987)).
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contract scheme had been carefully negotiated and crafted and
that the terms, conditions, and operation of those contracts should
not be ignored or “emasculated” by converting the matter to a tort
action. Following Prichard Bros. I, the Minnesota Supreme Court in
Prichard Bros. II, with little analysis, found it “unnecessary to
determine the contractual relationship, if any, between Prichard
232
and Grady . . . .” No court in Minnesota seems to have offered an
explanation as to why the carefully crafted contract scheme should
be emasculated by a tort action.
VIII.

MINNESOTA IN THE 1990S

A. Hapka v. Paquin Farms, the Case of the Bad Potatoes
In 1990, the Minnesota Supreme Court was given another
opportunity to analyze the Superwood decision and its progeny.
233
Hapka v. Paquin Farms began with the Hapkas’ purchase of seed
234
“The
potatoes from Paquin Farms, which they then planted.
planting process included cutting the potatoes into smaller pieces
for propagation. The machinery used for cutting and planting
those seed potatoes was later used for cutting and planting other
potatoes bought from a third source and planted in another
235
field.” A state inspection discovered ring rot in the fields planted
with the Paquin seed potatoes and also in the fields planted with
236
the machinery used to plant the seeds from the third source.
Presumably, the machinery had been contaminated by the Paquin
seed potatoes and thus had passed the ring rot on to the non237
This distinction is critical because under
Paquin potato fields.
Superwood, the original Paquin seed potatoes fields would have
238
But,
constituted “economic loss relating to the product itself.”
the ring rot in the non-Paquin potato fields that was passed on by
the machinery would have qualified under Superwood as “damage to
239
other property.” It is necessary to recall that the Superwood court

232. Id.
233. 458 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1990).
234. Id. at 685.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See id. at 691.
239. See id. at 686 (quoting Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311
N.W.2d 159, 162 (Minn. 1981)).
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held that “economic losses that arise out of commercial
transactions, except those involving personal injury or damage to
other property, are not recoverable under the tort theories of
240
negligence or strict products liability.”
Hapka pointed out numerous state supreme and appellate
court decisions that had wrestled with the “other property” issue,
citing Minneapolis Society of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Associates
241
Architects, Inc., S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Aerospatiale Helicopter
242
243
Corp., Valley Farmers’ Elevator v. Lindsay Bros., Thofson v. Redex
244
245
Industries, Inc., Holstad v. Southwestern Porcelain, Inc., American
246
Home Assurance Co. v. Major Tool & Machine, Inc., and Agristor
247
Leasing v. Guggisberg.
After reviewing the decision in Superwood,
the Hapka court criticized Superwood:
Having set the stage for an exception designed to preserve
the availability of tort remedies based on negligence and
strict products liability in actions arising out of consumer
transactions, the court instead carved out an exception for
cases arising out of commercial transactions involving
248
personal injury or damage to other property.
Hapka then discussed the complete adequacy of remedies in
the U.C.C. and pointed out that “[t]he Code itself indicates that
the U.C.C. is intended to displace tort liability. The Code contains

240. Superwood, 311 N.W.2d at 162 (emphasis added).
241. 354 N.W.2d 816, 819–20 (Minn. 1984) (“To hold that buildings constitute
‘other property’ would effectively overrule Superwood as to every seller of basic
building materials such as concrete, brick or steel because the ‘other property’
exception would always apply. The UCC provisions as applicable to component
suppliers would be totally emasculated.”).
242. 374 N.W.2d 431, 434 n.2 (Minn. 1985).
The certified question indicates that in addition to personal injury, a
‘nominal amount’ of other property was damaged. . . . We have
previously recognized that to allow a party to sue in tort to recover
substantial damages because of relatively minor damages to ‘other
property’ ‘would thwart the policy implications of Superwood[]’ . . . . Id.
(citations omitted).
243. 398 N.W.2d 553, 555 (Minn. 1987).
244. 433 N.W.2d 901, 903 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (“The loss of the Thofsons’
grain was the type of damage ‘which could ordinarily be contemplated by the
parties to a commercial transaction.’ Accordingly, the damage to the grain did
not constitute damage to ‘other property’ within the meaning of Superwood.”)
(citations omitted).
245. 421 N.W.2d 371, 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
246. 767 F.2d 446, 447–48 (8th Cir. 1985) (applying Minnesota law).
247. 617 F. Supp. 902, 908 (D. Minn. 1985) (applying Minnesota law).
248. Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683, 687–88 (Minn. 1990).
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provision for the recovery of incidental and consequential damages
249
The court then drew a distinction between
‘in a proper case.’”
250
consumer transactions and commercial transactions. The court’s
logic in this distinction was as follows:
Despite the U.C.C. provisions with respect to the
limitation of remedies, Minn. Stat. §§ 336.2–701 to 336.2–
725 (1982), we continue to regard the Code remedies as
something less than adequate in the ordinary consumer
transaction. Generally speaking, a consumer has neither
the skill nor the bargaining power to negotiate either
warranties or remedies. If a defective coffee pot causes a
fire which destroys a consumer’s home, the panoply of
liability theory should be available to the consumer-strict
products liability and negligence as well as breach of
warranty—whether or not personal injuries accompany
the property damage.
On the other hand, the law is entitled to expect the
parties to commercial transactions to be knowledgeable
and of relatively equal bargaining power so that warranties
can be negotiated to the parties’ mutual advantage.
Having negotiated the warranties and any limitations of
liability, that a defective product causes damage to other
property should not defeat the liability parameters the
parties have set by opening the door to tort theories of
recovery. While there is reason to sacrifice consistency in
order to preserve tort remedies for personal injuries
arising out of commercial transactions, as well as those
arising out of consumer transactions, there is no similar
reason in cases of property damage arising out of
commercial transactions to heap tort theories of
negligence and strict products liability atop those
remedies already available by the U.C.C. Accordingly, in
our judgment the Uniform Commercial Code must
control exclusively with respect to damages in a
commercial transaction which involves property damage
only, and any statement or implication to the contrary in
Superwood and its progeny is hereby expressly overruled.
If the Code is to have any efficacy, parties engaged in
commercial activity must be able to depend with certainty

249.
250.

Id. at 688.
Id.
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on the exclusivity of the remedies provided by the Code in
251
the event of a breach of their negotiated agreement.
Justice Yetka dissented, stating that he would have allowed
recovery on negligence theories with respect to the damage to
“other property;” in other words, he would have permitted recovery
on the potatoes planted in the non-Paquin potato fields that had
252
Interestingly,
been contaminated by the planting equipment.
Justice Yetka also dissented in part in the Superwood opinion in
253
1981.
“I must dissent, however, to that portion of the majority
opinion that concludes that the negligence of a manufacturer
cannot be asserted by a commercial plaintiff as a ground for
254
recovery of economic injury.”
B. Minnesota Statutes Section 604.10
As a result of continued litigation in the products liability
arena, including asbestos cases, the Minnesota Legislature in 1991
attempted to codify the economic loss doctrine in Minnesota
Statutes section 604.10 for economic losses that arise from the sale
of goods. The statute stated:
(a) Economic loss that arises from a sale of goods
that is due to damage to tangible property other
than the goods sold may be recovered in tort as well
as in contract, but economic loss that arises from a
sale of goods between parties who are each
merchants in goods of the kind is not recoverable in
tort.
(b) Economic loss that arises from a sale of goods,
between merchants, that is not due to damage to
tangible property other than the goods sold may not
be recovered in tort.
(c) The economic loss recoverable in tort under
this section does not include economic loss due to
255
damage to the goods themselves.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 688–89 (Yetka, J., dissenting).
253. Superwood, 311 N.W.2d at 162 (Yetka, J., dissenting).
254. Id.
255. MINN. STAT. § 604.10 (1992). Since 1992, section 604.10 has been
expanded to include subsection (d) and (e):
(d) The economic loss recoverable in tort under this section
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In 2000, the Minnesota Legislature enacted Minnesota Statutes
section 604.101, which provided additional definitions and limits
on product defect tort claims and common law misrepresentation
256
This section limits tort actions to “economic loss that
claims.
arises from a sale of goods that is due to damage to tangible
257
property other than the goods sold.” Tort actions for damage to
the goods themselves are not permitted and tort actions are also
not permitted under the statute for sales of goods between parties
258
“who are merchants in goods of the kind.”
Unfortunately,
Minnesota Statutes sections 604.10 and 604.101 were crafted for
pure sales of goods transactions and did not contemplate
construction projects that involve a combination of goods, services,
and labor. Whether a construction contractor is a “merchant in
goods of the kind” is an open question, especially with respect to
such components as concrete, structural steel, electrical wiring,
switch gears, or an elevator. Since the statute applies to “sale of
goods” it would appear on its face to be inapplicable to services
259
provided by architects, engineers, or other design professionals.
Section 604.10 represents a positive step for the economic loss
doctrine as it relates to construction projects to the extent that it
recognizes the economic loss doctrine for “(a) Economic loss due
to the goods themselves; and (b) Sales of goods between parties
260
who are merchants in goods of the kind.”
It appears, however, that the application of the economic loss
doctrine to construction projects and their unique contractual
scenarios is otherwise left to the courts to wrestle with in the years
to come.

does not include economic loss incurred by a manufacturer of
goods arising from damage to the manufactured goods and
causes by a component of the goods.
(e) This section shall not be interpreted to bar tort causes of
action based upon fraud of fraudulent or intentional
misrepresentation of limit remedies for those actions.
MINN. STAT. § 604.10 (2006).
256. MINN. STAT. § 604.101 (2000).
257. Id. § 604.10.
258. Id. § 604.10(a).
259. Id.
260. Id. § 604.10
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C. Major Industries, Inc. v. Krech, Ojard & Associates
In 2004, the Minnesota Court of Appeals again wrestled with
the economic loss doctrine in the unpublished case of Major
261
Industries, Inc. v. Krech, Ojard & Associates. Krech, an architectural
and engineering firm, was retained to prepare bid specifications for
262
Major Industries was a
a school project containing skylights.
skylight manufacturer that proposed use of its skylights to a bidder
263
on the project, St. Germain’s Glass Co. However, after award of
the contract, Krech informed Major Industries that its skylights
were not “equal” and could not be used on the project even though
264
they had been listed as an approved manufacturer. St. Germain’s
used a competitor’s skylights that cost $4000 more than Major
265
Industries’ skylights.
Major Industries sued, and the trial court
granted summary judgment for Krech on the grounds that Krech
266
did not owe a duty to Major Industries. This case appears to be in
sharp contradiction to Waldor Pump, and Major Industries appealed
267
the dismissal of the tort claim on that basis. The court of appeals
distinguished Waldor Pump and upheld the trial court’s dismissal of
268
the negligence action.
The basis of the distinction of Waldor
Pump, while reaching a result consistent with the application of the
economic loss doctrine, is interesting. The court distinguished
Waldor Pump as follows:
Here, appellant was not bound to follow the specifications
prepared by Krech because no contract yet existed. In
addition, there is no evidence that appellant changed its
position as a result of the specifications; appellant does
not allege that it had already manufactured the skylights
. . . or that it passed up other work. . . . Therefore, Waldor
Pump is distinguishable and the district court properly
269
refused to extend its holding here.
It appears the court found that no “reliance” resulted upon
Krech’s services by Major Industries and that no damages were

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

No. A04-1052, 2004 WL 2940912 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2004).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
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270

proximately caused by such reliance and breach of duty.
However, Waldor Pump’s damages resulted in it being required to
supply a more expensive pump as a result of OSM’s rejection of the
271
Wilden pump.
St. Germain’s also was required to supply more
272
Thus, it
expensive goods, but apparently did not sue Krech.
appears that Major Industries is not based upon a recognition of the
economic loss doctrine, but instead a failure to establish that Major
Industries “forseeably relied” upon Krech’s services and a lack of
damages proximately caused by Krech’s negligence. Presumably St.
Germain’s could have maintained an action against Krech for
273
negligence following the rationale in Waldor Pump.
IX. ECONOMIC LOSS IN CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS
At least two arguments exist in favor of applying the economic
loss rule to construction projects for purely economic losses. The
first arises from Justice Cardozo’s logic as articulated in Ultramares
274
Corp. v. Touche, contending that to allow parties to pursue purely
economic losses based on tort theories in a construction project
would expose parties to “liability in an indeterminate amount for
275
an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.” The second is
the application of the logic behind the Superwood decision that the
parties on construction projects have already defined, typically in
intricate detail, their obligations in their contracts between the
parties and that those carefully crafted contractual schemes should
276
not be defeated by opening the door to tort theories of liability.
In Hapka, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the
sanctity of commercial transactions between knowledgeable parties
277
It is confusing, then, that
of relatively equal bargaining power.
such a rule would not apply to construction projects that contain
detailed contract schemes outlining the rights, responsibilities,
liabilities, and limitations of the parties. The Hapka decision seems

270. Id.
271. Waldor Pump & Equip. Co. v. Orr-Schelen-Mayeron & Assocs., Inc., 386
N.W.2d 375, 376 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
272. See Major Indus., Inc., 2004 WL 2940912, at *1.
273. See id.
274. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
275. Id. at 444.
276. See Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp., 311 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Minn.
1981).
277. Hapka v. Paquin Farms, 458 N.W.2d 683, 688 (Minn. 1990).
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to set the stage for the recognition by courts in Minnesota,
consistent with other states, that purely economic losses arising out
of commercial construction projects, except those involving
personal injury, should not be recoverable under tort theories of
negligence or strict products liability. While some may think that
this rule benefits design professionals and not contractors, it would
clearly apply to both contractors and design professionals. A
design professional who incurs additional costs to remedy an error
by a construction contractor is as able to sue the contractor directly
in a tort theory as a contractor who has been damaged by delay or
additional costs due to errors caused by a design professional. This
rule would benefit all parties to commercial construction projects
in that the contracts negotiated between the parties to a
commercial construction project would not be emasculated by
application of tort theories of liability. The party who spends hours
negotiating a detailed indemnification clause or limitation of
liability or limitation on consequential damages should not have
those provisions defeated by another party to the construction
process who elects to bring an action based on tort rather than
contract.
A. What is the Status of the Economic Loss Doctrine Today?
278

Even with Minnesota Statutes sections 604.10 and 604.101,
confusion still exists over the economic loss doctrine that will
prompt debate and litigation in the Minnesota courts. One issue
that has not been addressed in this article is the original pleading
of construction cases. To date, Minnesota practitioners will
commonly plead a construction case on multiple theories of breach
of contract and tort action with attendant cross-claims for tort
contribution and indemnity. If Minnesota strictly followed the
economic loss rule—meaning that parties to construction contracts
should only be permitted to bring breach of contract actions for
economic losses arising out of property damage—then clearly a
279
Rule 12 motion to dismiss the tort actions on the pleadings would
be appropriate. Tort actions in a construction case along with
apportionment of liability and contribution and indemnity have
simply become “convenient” for the courts and the practitioners.

278.
279.

MINN. STAT. §§ 604.10, 604.101 (2006).
MINN. R. CIV. P. 12.
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Unfortunately, contract law should be granted greater respect than
to be dismissed simply as a matter of convenience.
X. CONCLUSION
It is undeniable that the boundaries of contract law have been
consistently eroded since Justice Cardozo authored his MacPherson
280
opinion in 1916. Of significance, however, is that by the time of
his Ultramares decision in 1931, Justice Cardozo was questioning
281
how much erosion of the privity barrier was too much. Just as he
questioned his decisions, it appears to be time for Minnesota to
address the “definite conflict” that exists between tort and contract
principals in the area of construction litigation as observed by the
282
After Waldor Pump, Minnesota courts clearly
court in Prichard I.
wrestled with the boundary between contract and tort actions in
both the Prichard Bros. cases and Hapka.
Perhaps some
practitioners would argue that tort actions are necessary to allow
apportionment of damages and contribution and indemnity
theories. While it might be somewhat inconvenient for a design
professional or contractor to sue an owner—the party with whom
they are in privity of contract—rather than each other, absolutely
no rational reason exists to defeat a carefully crafted contract
scheme by such a direct action. No reason exists that at trial the
special verdict form could not be crafted as a breach of contract
action. While there would, by definition, not be a classic
apportionment of damages, a jury could certainly determine the
damages that naturally flow from the breach of contract by a party.
In a breach of contract action, a damaged party is entitled to be put
in the same position as if the contract had been performed. Part of
the confusion in construction cases is that multiple parties are
typically accused of breaching their contracts and failing to
perform their services properly. There is no reason, however, that
a jury cannot sort out damages as between multiple parties who
have been found to have breached their contracts. Contribution
and indemnity actions are not entirely lost; a reading of the
contracts between the parties frequently discloses rights to
indemnification by and between the various parties to a

280.
281.
282.

111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931).
407 N.W.2d 423 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
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283

construction project.
Clearly, the sanctity of contracts can be
maintained while achieving results similar to the classic tort theory
of damages apportionment, contribution, and indemnity. Contract
law should not have to drown in a sea of tort.

283.

See AIA DOCUMENT A201, supra note 26, § 3.18.
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